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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3515 
E. H. vVELLES, LEONARD C. WELLES AND RICHARD 
H. WELLES, TRADING UNDER THE· STYLE AND 
FIRM NAME OF WELLES ENGINEERING COM-
P ANY,· Appellants, 
versi1,s 
EDGAR W. REVERCO:MB AND ETHEL F. NAGLE, 
Appellees. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supre'l1ie Court of .Appeal$ 
of· Virginia: 
Your petitioners, E. H. vVelles, Leonard C. Welles, and 
Richard H: vVelles, trading as "\V elles Engineering Company, 
respectfully represent that they are aggrieved by a final 
decree of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, en.: 
tered on the 3rd day of August, 1948, in a chancery suit 
brought to enforce a mechanic's lien against the property of 
Edgar W. Revercomb and Ethel F. Nagle, which decre~ sus-· 
tained the defendants' claim that they were n9t liable to the 
complainants solely because the complainants were not prop-
erly licensed to do business. ., 
Your petitioners pray that an appeal may be allowed them 
against Edgar W. Revercomb and Ethel F. Nagle. A tra11-
script of the record in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, 
Virginia, is filed herewith. 
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2• •FACTS 
Appellants, a co-partnership, doing business. under the style 
and firm name of "Welles Engineering Company", with its 
principal office in the Town of Vienna, Virginia, on N ovem-
ber 18, 1947, entered into a contract with Edgar W. Rever-
comb, one of the Appellees, Ethel F. Nagle, the other appellee 
having acquired a one-half undivided interest in the property 
subsequent to the making of the contract. By said contract, 
it was agreed that for actual cost plus fifteen per centum 
(15% ), appellants would furnish the plans for and ·construct 
certain building·s on Appellees' premises in Fairfax County, 
Virginia. . 
By the terms of said contract, weekly statements, in detail, 
showing all costs for each week up to and including the close 
of work on Wednesday thereof we1·e to be fnruh;hcd Appel-
lees on Thursday of each weHk and on f:'aid day, Appellees 
were then to pay the c.osts shown by such statement to have 
been incurred during the prior week. T.he e•Jntract further 
provided for payments of the additional 15% at the comple-
tion of. particular portions of the work. 
Constrnction began during the week the contract was con-
cluded and progressed in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement until April 23, 1948, at which time, appellees re-
fused to pay the cost for the labor and the materials furn-
ished for the week then immediately passed. Appellants 
thereupon ceased work and thereafter recorded their memo-
randum of mechanic's lien against said property in the office 
of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
Appellants, on the 1st day of June, 1948, filed their bill iu 
equity seeking the sale of appellee~' property for the enforce-
ment and satisfaction of the above-mentioned mechanic's lien. 
Orl the 24th day of July, '1948, appellees filed their special 
plea setting forth, among other things, that appellants were 
not licensed as a contractor as required by Virginia 'rax 
Code Section 176 and should not, the ref ore, be ~ill owed 
3* to maintain their suit. *To which special plea, appellants, 
on August 3, 1948, filed their demurrer, stating that Sec-
t~on 176 of the Tax Code was purely a revenue measure and 
that it was not the intention of the legislature that a party 
to a contract who had not paid the taxes therein demanded 
should be denied legal redress in a court of justice. 
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The· issue raised by the special plea and demnrror was 
argued by Counsel on Aug'llst 3, 1948, and on said date a final 
decree was entered, wherein appellant's demurrer was over-· 
ruled ~nd the special plea sustained on the grounds above-
mentioned, to which ruling· of the court, appellants noted their 
exceptions. 
ERROR. ASSIGNED. 
The ruling of the Circuit Court, as expre~sed in its final 
decree entered on the 3rd day of August, 1948, is in error. : 
QUESTION INVOLVED IN APPEAL 
(1) Construction of Section 176, Virginia Tax Code, ] 942. 
(a) Police Measure Y 
(b) R,evenue·Measure7 
(c) The intent of the Leg·islatur~ in rega1:d to the validity 
of contracts made by persons who have not complied with its 
provisions? 
(2) Will a court of justice refuse redress to a person on 
a valid contract when it is shown that such person has neg-
lected to pay a tax and for this reason only is in violatjon ·of 
a statute which is in no way regulatory, is for revenue pur-
poses only,. and in w:hich the Legislature neither expressly 
nor by implication declares void contracts made by such per-
sons. 
ARGUMENT 
The Contention of the appellees is that this contract. is in-
valid because entered into by the appellants prior to hav-
4 e ing 8 obtained a contractor's license as required by·the 
provisions found in the Virginia Tax Code, as follows.(. 
SECTION 176. '' Contractors, plumbers and steam fittersl 
Any person, ·firm or corporation accepting or offering to ac-
cept orders or contracts for doing any work on or in any 
building or structure, requiring the use of paint, stone, brick, 
motar, wood, cement, structural iron or steel sheet iron, g·al-
vanized iron, metallic piping, tin, lead, electric wiring o 1· 
other metal or any other building material, or who shall ac-
cept or offer to accept contracts to do any paving, curbing or 
other work on sidewalks, streets, alleys, or highways, public 
or private property, using asphalt, brick, tone, cement, con-
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crete, wood or any composition, or wl10 shall accept or offer 
to accept an order for or contract to excavate earth, rock, or 
other ~aterial for foundation or any other purpose or who 
· shall accept or offer to accept an order or contract to construct 
any sewer of stone, brick, terra cotta or other .material, shall · 
be deemed a contractor; provided, however, that any person, 
firm or corporation engaging in the business of plumbing, and 
steam fitting in cities, towns or counties which have adopted 
or may hereafter adopt rules and regulations for the purpose 
of securing sanitary construction, alteration and inspection 
of plumbing and sewer connections and drains, pursuant to 
section fifteen hundred and forty-four of the Code of Virginia, 
shall not be deemed to be a contractor, as defined in this sec-
tion, but shall pay for the privilege of conducting the busi-
ness of plumbing· and steam fitting·, the same license as that 
required of contractors by this section; and provided further, 
that any person, firm, or corporation engaging in the busi-
ness of selling ~nd erecting, tombstones shall not be deemed 
to be a contractor as defined by this section. 
"Every contractor and every plumber and st~am fitter shall, 
on the first day of January in each year, procure from the 
commissioner of the revenue, for the city or county in which 
lie has his office a license to carry on the business of a con-
tt9aetor, plumber or steam fitter; provided, that if such con-
tractor, plumber or steam fitter has no office in this state, 
then he shall procure such license from the commissioner of 
the revenue for the city or county where he conducts his 
business. 
"When a contractor or a plumbing and steam fitting con-
tractor shall have paid the aforesaid state license and local 
license required by the city or town, in which his principal 
office and any branch office or offices may be located, no fur-
ther license shall be required by the State or other city or 
town for conducting any such business within the confines of 
this State, except that qualifications under section :fifteen -hun-
dred and forty-four of the Code may be required of contrac-
tors doing plumbing and provided that this section shall not 
apply to contractors, plumbers, and steam fitters, the gross 
of whose orders accepted and executed does not a;mount to 
one thousand dollars per annum. 
"E,very such contractor, plumber and steam fitter, for the 
privilege of transacting business in this State, •shall 
a• pay a license, to be ascertained in the following manner: 
"If the gross amount of all orders or contracts ac-
oopted during the preceding year aggregated as much as one 
thousand dollars and not more than five thousand dollars, he 
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~ shall pay the sum of five dollars; if the amount of such orders 
or contracts was more than .five thousand dollars and did 
- not exceed ten thousand dollars, ten dollars; if the amount 
of such orders or contracts exceeded ten thousand dollars, 
and did not exceed twenty thousand dollars, fifteen aonars; 
if the amount of such orders or contracts exceeded twenty 
thousand dollars, and did not exceed fifty thousand dollars, , 
twenty dollars; if the amount of such orders or contracts ex-
ceeded fifty thousand dollars, and did not exceed one pundred 
thousand dollars, fifty dollars; if the amount of such orders 
or contracts exceeded one hundred thousand dollars, and did 
not exceed one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, one hun-
dred dollars; if the amount of such orders or contracts ex-
ceeded one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and did not 
exceed three hundred thousand dollars, one hundred and fifty 
dollars; and if the amount of such contracts or orders ex-
ceeded three hundred thousand dollars, two hundred and fifty 
dollars. 
'' The license tax on every contractor, plumber and steam fit-
ter beginning business shall be measured in accordance witl1 
the. foregoing scale by the g·ross amount of all 'orders or con-
tracts which he has accepted before applying for the license 
plus the gross amount of all orders or contracts which he esti-
mates he will accept between the date of the issuance of his 
license and the thirty-first of December, following. 
'' Tl1e councils or other governing bodies of cities and towns 
may, by ordinance or ordinances, classify contractors for the 
purpose of city or town license taxation and may impose upon 
each class the same or different rates of tax. 
'' This section as hereby ame11ded, shall be in force for the 
license year beginning Janna ry first, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-nine, and for every year thereafter until otherwise pro-
vided by law.'' 
SECTION 127. "When n license is required: may be 
granted whenever tax imposed.-Whenever a license·is speci-
ally required by law, and whenever the general assembly 
shull levy a license tax on any business, employment, -or pro-
fession, it shall be unlawful without a license to engage in 
such business, employment or profession. In all cases wh-er<: 
such tax is imposed, it shall be lawful to grant a license 
for the business, employment or profession so taxed; but no 
person shall be all°'ved the privilege of selling throughout 
the state under one license except by special provision of 
law.'' · 
SECTION 136. '' Prosecuting busincss,employments or pro-
fession without a license ; penalties. If any person, firm, or cor-
6 Supreme Cotitt of Appeals of Virginia . 
po.ration· shall continue· the business, employment or· prof es:. · 
sibrl after the expiration of a license previously issued without 
o};jtaini,ng a·rie'w license, such person, firm or corporation shall, 
if sri~h failure td obtain· a· new license· be co.ntinued f~r one 
month; be·subject to a··penalty ot ten pet ceiitUm·of the amoUt 
of the,;lieerise·tax which was due and·payable at the beginning 
... . of such month, in addition· to' the license tax imposed 
6-= 41:by law, and· such penalty shall be assessed and paid 
, alol'.).g with· the license tax and shall become a part of the 
l~ce~se tax·; but such penalty shall in no case be less than two 
d<>mfrs;: Ir such failure to obt'ain a new license be continued 
fot a longer period than one rrionth, such person, :firm or 
cb,i,'poratfon shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and1 unless· 
otherwis~ specially provided· by law shall on conviction there-
of; oe: finen· not less than five dollars nor more than orie" thou-· 
s~d' dollars' fo't.; ea~h· sepatate· offense· commit:fied: after suchi 
e~iratiori of su~h' month; and the· taxes and penalty pro-
vided in the preceding pa rt of this section shall also· be, 
a:s~ess~d a1gainst su·ch pe-rs·ort, :fitrri' oi- corpo•ration, and collec-
tfo'rr theteof enfotced in the manner provided by law for the' 
e'#forcement ot the c6Hection of other taxes. In. such case,, 
if sllcli petson~ fh'm or corp·ot·atiot1, shall, orr demand, fail or 
r~f use to· file with' the assessing officer the i11fotmaiion ileces·-
s·i:J:ry to' enable h:in'1 to assess a license tax according to the 
b'asis provi:de'd .bY law; such assessing officer shall assess such 
lic'etrse tax ttpbn the b'est information he can obtain, adding 
ilier~td the penalty prescribed by law~ . 
''If any tletson, firm, or corporation shall; in violation of 
law, c~mmen~e to pr~secute any business, employment. or pro-
f~~siO'n without a license, such person, firm, or corporation, 
~liaU be guilty of a misdemeanor and unless otherwise speci-
·ficlilly p:ro'vided by law,shall,on conviction thereof, be fined not 
less than five dollars nor more than one thousand dollais for 
e~hh SeJ?arate ~ffense. Such ~onviction sliall not relieve an7 
sm~li perso~, firm ar corporat10n from the payment of the h-
c~hs~ tax prescribed by law. If such violation of law be 
c9iitintied for ohe month such person, firm or corporation 
~liall itioreov~r be subject tti a penalty of ten per centum of 
tb~ iimottilt of the license fax which was due and payable at 
th~ ,&ginning· of such month, in addition to the license tax 
~~osed by law mrd such penalty shall be assessed and paid 
!long with the license tax and shall become a part of the li-
oens·e tax; but such penalty shall in 110 case be less than two 
dollars. The collection of such taxes and penalty shall be 
eht~rccd in the h1ani1er provided by law for 'the enforcement 
of the colle'ction ·of other. taxes. In such ·case, if such person, 
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firm or co'rporation shall, on demand, fail or refuse to file 
with the assessing officer the information necessary to enable 
him to assess a license tax according to the. basis provided by 
·Iaw, such assessing officer shall assess such license tax upon 
the best information he can obtain, adding thereto the pen-
. alty prescribed by law. , 
"It shall be the duty of tlle commissioner of the revenue 
to report every person, firm or corporation, who shall com-
mence to prosecute any licensable business, employment or 
profession without a license, or who shall unlawfully fail for 
a longer period than o:rie month to obtain a new license, to the 
attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall cause warrants to 
be issued for such persons, firms or corporations and shall 
prosecute them."' · 
Appellees rely on the general rule that contracts made in 
contravention of a statute are illegal and·therefore, void, and 
u~enforceable, but at the outset, by a careful reading of the 
the statute relied upon, it, is easily recognized that the 
7* contract *here under consideration is not in violation 
thereof, nor is' it in violation of public policy or of any 
other statute. 
A reference to the language used in Section 176 discloses 
that the Legislature anticipated the making of •contracts by 
unlicensed petsons : · 
'' The license tax on every contractor, * * • beginning busi-
ness shall be measured in accordance with the foregoing 
scale by the gross amount of all orders or contracts which 
he has accepted before applying for the license plus" • • *. 
With the Legislature so anticipating the making of con-
tracts by unlicensed persons and expressing no prohibition 
thereof, it cannot be successfully contended that an unli-
censed person who makes a contract is in violation of said 
statute, and if he be not in violation of the statute his con-
tract, so made, cannot he declared illegal and void on such 
ground. 
Even without the provision. showing the anticipation on 
the part of the Legislature, there is other language in said 
statutes, which conclusively shows that the contract under 
consideration is not illeg·al because in contravention thereof. 
The provisions of Sections 127, 136 and 176 (already quoted) 
do not prohibit the making of the contract in question or de-
clare it void, the collection of a tax and the punishment of 
the person failing to pay the tax is intended, and not that 
· a contract, otherwise valid, made by an unlicensed .contrac-
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tor in pursuance of a lawful business, shall be rendered void. 
The language used in Section 127-
,' • • • whenever the general assembly shall levy a license 
tax on .any business * * *, it shall be unlawful without a li-
cense to engage in such business,'' • * •. 
and Section 136-
" If any person * * * shall continue the business • * "' after 
the expiration of a license * * ~ such person shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
If any person * * * commence to prosecute any business 
* • • without a license, such person • * * shall be guilty of 
misdemeanor.'' * * • 
shows clearly tl1at the prohibition was directed to the·. 
8* person *and not to the business; the business is in no 
way regulated and is not made unlawful, and contracts 
in pursuance ·of such business are, neither expressly nor by 
implication rendered unlawful, it is the person1 engaging in 
such business who is in violation of the law and the penalty 
for such violation stated in Section 136 is directed against 
the person, not against the business nor against the contract 
entered in pursuance thereof; and, nowhere in any of said 
sections is there found a provision that contracts entered 
by unlicensed persons are prohibited .or that they shall be 
illegal and unenforceable. 
Should the languaµ;e of the subject statutes, which is con-
clusively in favor of the validity of this contract, be over-
looked altogether and the contract be assumed to be in vio-
lation of the statute, and, therefore, subject to the general 
rule, there are yet exceptions to that general rule which 
would exempt this contract from the operation thereof and 
sustain it as valid and enforceable. 
That Section 176 is purely a tax measure is beyond rea-
sonable doubt for the reasons that; 
First: It is found in the appendix of the Virginia Coq.e, 
1942, which is labeled, "The Tax Code." 
Second: Chapter 1 of the Tax Code begins as follows: 
"Section 1.-The tax code of Virginia.-The laws em-
ployed in the following chapters and sections of this act shall 
constitute and be desig'llated and cited as, the Tax Code of 
Vfrginia. '' 
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And, further, by again referring to the language of Section 
176, we find that same contains little more than a lengthy 
definition, designating the persons who are to fall within its 
provisions as contractors, and the statement that: 
"Every such contractor, plumber or steam fitter for the 
privilege of transacting business in this State shall pay a 
license '' • * *. 
It is to be noted that said lang·uag·e provides, 
"for the privilege of transacting· business in this State, shall 
pay a license.'' 
9* *and that there is no further requirement or reg11Iation 
of any kind imposed. There is found in said statute, 
relating to contractors as there defined, nothing which in-
volves the public policy, health, morals, safety or welfare. 
The measure has as its one and only subject, the collection of 
a tax, the obtaining of money for the Treasury of the State, 
only that ·and nothing more. 
Plumbers and. steam fitters are exempted from the defini-
tion of contractors; this exemption, as shown, is fo~ the pur-
pose of permitting the regulation of persons engaged in such 
business; to require them to qualify and to abide by health. 
and safety rules and to provide for the inspection of t}1eir 
work, all in the exercise of the police power seeking to bet-
ter protect the public health and general welfare. 
The fact that contractors, in general, are made subject to 
nothing further than the payment of a tax is significant in 
that it demonstrates that, as pertains to contractors in gen-
eral, Section 176, is a revenue me~sure only, requiring of a 
certain class of persons a license; and made for the sole pur-
pose of raising· revenue. Further demonstrating that .the 
statutes in question are purely revenue measures is tl}e 
method by which the aµiount of the tax is to be computed, 
i. e., one amount for a business of one size and a larger or 
smaller amount for a different size business. · 
The general rule that contracts made in contravention of .. 
a statute are illegal, and unenforceable is subject to the ex-
ception, which exempts the contract under consideration 
from the operation thereof; that, when it.is found that the 
law requiring the license is not an exercise of the police 
power, but is strictly a Revenue Law, the sole object being 
to get money into the Treasury, a contract will not be held. 
invalid merely because a stipulated license fee has not been 
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paid. This exception has been recognized in a recent case 
before this court : , 
10• *In Massie v. Dudley, 173 Virginia, 42 (1939). 
An action by one not licensed as a real estate broker 
to recover a commission for services rendered in connection 
with negotiations culminating in a sale of the real estate. 
The defense being the lack of the license. The contract was 
held to be void and unenforceable. The Court said: Sylla-
bus, 44: 
"Where a licensing statute is a police regulation having 
for its object tlle protection of the public, * "" •, a contract 
made by an. unlicensed person is void and unenforceable.'' 
"The statute regulating the real estate business and re-
quiring brokers to procure a license, ii • "", was designed to 
protect the public from fraud, misrepresentation and imposi-
tion of dishonest and incompetent persons. '' 
"The statute regulating the· real estate business and re-
quiring brokers to procure a license, • "" •, is a valid ~xercise 
of. the police power, and not merely a revenue measure'', • • •. 
, This court in adhering to the general rule above stated, but 
recognizing the exceptions, upheld the defense and declared 
the contract void. A careful inspection of the opinion dis-
closes the ground upon which the court reached its conclu-
sion. The statute requiring a license of real estate brokers 
required that applicants show certain qualifications before the 
issuance of th.e license and that licensees submit to regulation; 
this was an exercise of the police power and not a mere reve-
nue measure. It is clear from the opinion of the court that a 
distinction was· deemed to exist between a case like the pre-
:-1ent, where only the collection of the revenue is involved, 
and the case there under consideration; where the statute was 
ex::clusively a police regulation, aimed at the control and reg-
ulation, of the real estate business, involving in a high de-
gree the general welfare of the state. Ref erring once more to 
the ~anguage used; 
"Where the licensing statute is a police regulation, hav-
ing for its object, the protection of the public, • •-+ a contract 
made by an unlicensed person is void and unenforceable. The 
statute regulating the real estate business am,d requiring 
brokers to procure a license • • •, •is a val,id exercise 
11 • of the · police po'Wer and not 1merely a revenue meas-
ure" • * "'. (Emphasis ours.) 
it becomes increasingly appal'ent that the contract made by 
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fhe unlicensed real estate broker would have been held valid 
!lnd enforceable- ba!=1 th~ court been able to conclude, in that 
mstance, that the hcensmg· statute was not a police measure 
but merely a revenue measure. 
We have been unable to. find any case in which the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia has p~ssed on the valid-
ity of a contract made by an unlicensed person. when the 
statute requiring the license was an exercise of the taxing 
power only, the Virginia decisions appear to have dealt with 
statutes in which the police power was involved. Other 
jurisdictions, however, have dealt directly with the question. 
· Lloyd v. Johnson, 45 App. D. C. 322, (1916). 
Decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia. Suit was brought by an unlicensed real estate broker· 
to recover an agreed commission on the sale price of certain 
real estate. 
The sole defense was that the plaintiff, was doing business 
without a license, and his contract for a commission there-
fore was void and un~nforceable. 
The Court in this case found the statute to be a revenue 
measure only and the contract to be valid and enforceable. 
The pertinent parts of the law of the District of Columbia 
at that time in force, requiring a broker to obtain a license, 
as quoted in the opinion, read as follows: 
"Section 7, 32 Stat. at L. 622, Chapter 1352, relating to 
the general subject of 'license taxes' in the District of Col-
umbia among other things provides: 
'' Section 7. That no person shall engag·e in or carry on any 
business, trade, profession, or calling in the District of Col-
umbia, for which a license tax is imposed by the terms of 
this section without having- first obtained a license so to 
do•••. 
12* *"Par. 15. That real estate .brokers or agents shall 
pay a license tax of $50.00 per annum • * *. 
"Par. 47. That any person violating the provisions of tl1is 
section on conviction thereof *i< * *, be punished by a fine of 
not more than $500.00 for each separate offense and in de-
fault of payment by imprisonment not exceeding thi~ty days, 
in the discretion of the court, * * *. '' 
.The Court said: 
· ''Where the purpose of a statute imposing a license tax on 
those engaged in certain occupations is to raise revenue, and 
not to regulate such oc~upa.tions, .~nd no question of p~blie · 
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policy or morals is involved; a contract made by one engaged 
in one of such occupations is not void between himself and 
the other party to the contract; and it is immaterial that the 
~tatute prohibits the carrying on of the occupation in ques 
tion without a license and imposes a penalty for so doing.'' 
Said Court citing: 
'' Ba;nk of U.S. v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527; 'There can be no civil 
right where there can be no legal remedy; and there can be 
no legal remedy for that which is itself illegal.' " 
'' To this general rule, however, the courts have found ex-
ception. For the exception, resort must be bad to the in-
tent of the Legislature, as well as to the subject matter of the 
legislation. The test for the applications of the exception, 
is pointed out in Pangho 1rn .. v. Westlake, 36 Iowa 546, as fol-
lows: 'We are,. therefore, brought to tbe true test, which is, 
that while, as a general rule, the penalty implies a prohibi-
tion, yet the courts will always look tp the language of the 
ijtatute, the subject matter of it, the wrong. or evil which it 
seeks to remedy or preve~t and the purpose sou~·ht to be 
accomplished by its enactment; and if, from all these, it is 
manifest that it was not intended to imply a. prohibition or 
to rendPr thP. prohibited act void, the courts will so bold and 
construe the statute accordingly.'' 
''That statutes imposing· license taxes, involving no ex-
ercise of the police power of tbe State nor any question of 
public policy, and which do not expressly prohibit unlicensed 
persons from making contracts nor declare such contracts 
void, come within the exception, is well settled by l?oth Eng-
lish and American cases. '' 
Citing also : 
"Banks v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518, where the court said: 
"Where the law declares the consequences of its ~violation, 
the contract can in no sense be regarded illegal unless the 
law itself, either by its manifest intent or in express terms 
so declares it. The provisions of the Code ref erred to 
neither directly nor indirectly ref er to any consequences; save 
the payment of a fine for a violation of the law, and the 
failure to pay such fine, so that it can only be regarded as 
a revenue measure, and does not affect the contract 
13* '*between the unlicensed peddler a.nd the purchaser of 
goods from him. It will, however, be found to be a 
question.depending in gre~t part, if not altogether, upon the 
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phraseology of the particular statute under consideration. 
If the· statute seeks only the coll.ection of the revenue as ours 
clearl1 does, there can be no doubt as to its purpose and 
meamn&9, but when, as already state~, it is the design of the 
.lawmakmg- power to protect the pubhc from fraud in the con-
tract or for the promotion of some object of public policv 
the contract is then prohibited. ··' 
"~his being.a revenue statute, it is to be strictly construed 
~nd ~ts operation should not be extended oy implication. It 
1s ~either remedial nor founded upon any principal of public 
pohcy.'' 
Howard v. Lebby, 197 Kentucky 324 (1923) decided by the 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 
An unlicensed contractor brought suit to. recover the con-
tract price for painting a house. The defense was that' the 
contract was illegal and void, as in contravention of an ordi-
nance in the City of Louisville, requiring· an annual license 
fee of $25.00, on contractors, providing that it should be un-
lawful for any person to follow the business of contracting 
in the City of Louisville without having first paid the license 
required. . 
The Court in construing the ordinance found same to be 
· a revenue measure only, and, held that the contract was valid 
and enforceable. · 
The reasoning of the 9ourt was. as follows: 
'' Such taxes may be imposed for the purpose of revenue 
or as a means of controlling or limiting· a particular vocation. 
In the. latter instance the imposition may result from the ex-
ercise of the police power. The first question, the ref ore, to 
be determined here is, was the ordinance primarily designed 
as a revenue measure or as a police reg·ulation.'' · 
· ''The police power, with respect to the State * * .. • extends 
only to the protection of the lives, health, comfort or welfare 
o:f the public, and an ordinance imposing a tax on an occup~-
tion cannot be justified as a proper exercise of that powe_r 
unless it appears that the requirement of a license tends to 
promote the public health, I'norals, safety, and welfare. In 
other words, the law does not countenance- the invasion of the 
rights of property or business under tlle pretext of ·a police 
regulation when it is manifest that such was not the object 
of the enactment. 17 R. C. L., P. 541.'' 
14~ *"This ordinance does not ·provide that contracts 
made by an unlicensed .follower of the occupation taxe<l 
shall be void. .All that it purports to do is to impose a Ii-: 
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cense tax, and, as a means of collecting it, provides, that it 
shall be unlawful to engage jn the occupation taxed without 
first obtaining a license~ It does not declare in express terms, 
nor in our opinion, by implication, that contracts made with-
out a license to engage in the business shall be void,'' • • •. , . 
'' The true test is, what was the intention of the enacting 
authority? If the license is authorized under the police 
power and may be granted or withheld • • • in the interest 
of the public, health, morals, or welfare, then the contract 
made by one who has not procured a license is void, because 
as to him the pursuing of the occupation is illegal; but if the 
tax is imposed as a revenue measure only, without restric-
tion as to the kind or class of persons entit~ed to a license, 
and necessarily therefore, without relation to the public 
heal.th, morals, or welfare, the infraction of the ordinance 
consists, not in pursuing the occupation, but in failing to 
pay the license fee," • • *. 
Leading texts also find exceptions to the general r1.Ile. 
ELLIOTT ON CONTRACTS-
Paragraph 267. "By the g-reat weight of authority a con-
tract entered into by an unlicensed person, engaged in a 
trade, business or profession required to be licensed, and 
made in the course of such trade business or profession, can-
not be enforced by such person, if it ·appears that the license 
1·equired by such statute is in whole or· in part, for the pro-
foction of the public, and to prevent .improper persons from 
engaging in such trade, business. or profession. If, however, 
the purpose of the statute is to raise revenue only, his right 
t9 enforce such cont root is not defeated by the want of a 
license." (Emphasis ours) 
Paragraph 669. "The effect of a penal statute on con-
tracts in derogation thereof also depends on the purpose 
for which the penalty is attached, in case the penalty is 
attached for the protection of the public, a contract which 
violates the statutory provisions is almost universally de-
clared void. On the other hand, if the law is strictly a Rev-
enue L<UµJ, the sole· object being to get money into the Trea-
sury, a contract will not be held irwalid merely because the 
·stiipulated license fee ha.s not been paid," *. * ""' (Emphasis 
ours) · 
Paragraph 1061. ''It must be bourne in mind that two dif-
ferent rules are applied to contracts enter into with on,e 
engaged in a business =which the law 1~equires to be li-
./ 
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~ensed .. Whether or not a contract entered into with one in 
the course of such business who has no license will be upheld 
~epends largely on the nature of the business and the word-
mg of ~he statute. In case the license is required for the 
pr~tection of the public the contract is void; in case it is 
m;erely a jeve'l'l!Ue measure the contract is valid.'' (Empha-
sis ours) 
15* WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS-Revis~d Edi-
tion) 
Paragraph 1768 .. Statutes sometimes impose a tax upon 
the transaction of certain business merely for the purpose 
of revenue, and not with any view to limiting or regulating 
the trade itself. If such stat-u,tes simply impose a penalty 
for failiwe to comply with their provisions, contracts made 
without paying the requisite taa; or obtaining the requisite 
license, are not thereby made unenforceable", 8 '"'· ~. (Em-
phasis ours) 
CORPUS JURIS-Volume 13, page 421. 
Section 352. ''Frequently a statute imposes a penalty on 
the doing of an act without either prohibiting it or ex-
pressly declaring it illegal or void. In cases of this kind, 
the decisions of the courts are not in harmony. The gen-
erally announced rule is that an agreement founded on or 
for the doing of such penalized act is void. • * * As a. 
qil,(1,lificatio1i of this rule, i.t is stated that, if the penalty 
is imposed for the protection of' the revenue it may be pre-
sumed that the legislatitre only desired to make it expen-
sive to the pa.rties in proportion as it is unprofitable to the 
revenue, and that their contracts are not void.'' ( Emphasis 
ours). 
RULING CASE LA"\V-Volume 6, page 704. 
SECTION 110. • * * '' A distinction has been frequently 
recognized between the statutes designed for the protection 
of the public and those designed for the raising of revenue. 
It appears that all the courts agree that where a statute, 
was enacted to protect the public against fraud 01~ imposi-
tion, or to safeguard the public health or morals, a ~ntrad 
in violation thereof is ordinarily void. * * • But with re-
spect to statittes which were enacted for the sole .1JUrpose of 
raising reve'l'l!Ue many courts have a-dopted the view that an 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
intention to reruler void a contract which is not m,alum in se 
or detrimental to the publ-ic will not be attributed to the 
legislature unless a contrary intention, is manifested by the 
language of the sta.fote. A reason. advanced in support of 
this view is that the doing of the act penalized by statute is 
permitted upon the payment of the penalty, that the penalty 
is a species of license money exacted for the privilege of 
doing the net, and that the act is not otherwise unlawful un-
less expressly declared so. The view with reference to reve-
nue statutes appears however, to be influenced by a regard 
for the consequences of declaring a contract invalid. Hence 
these courts ha,ve_ declared the.fr unurillingness· to attribute ot 
the legislature an iintention to encourage persons to avoid, 
their obligation beca1tse of non-co·mpliance with a statute in--
tended merely as a fiscal expedient," • * • . (Emphasis 
ours) · • 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LA 1l{ OF CONTRACTS 
. Chapter 18-Paragraph 580. 
'. 
I 
"Bargain in Violatiop of a Statute" 
• 
rn• •COMMENT: 
(a) The Legislature can prohibit the· formation of any bar-
gain and thereby make it illegal. The question whether the 
legislature has done so depends on interpretation of the leg-
islative action. In case, of express p1·ohibition or of de-
claring the act a. crime, there can be ·no doubt. With refer-
etice to the imposition of a penalty or the requirement of a 
license, the nt-le coonot. be so broadly stated. Le,qislative· 
intent must be SO'U,.Qht in each particU,lar case, and though it 
is generally true that the imposition of a penalty for enter-
ing into ·a bargain or performing an act that is the subject 
matter of the bargain makes the bargain illegal; that is not 
invariably the case. The same is true of the requirement of 
a;, license or inspection or similar forma1ity. A prohibition 
may be implied also from other terms of the statute." (Em-
phasis ours) 
It is to be noted that in Restatement of the Law of Con- '\. 
tracts, quoted above, heretofore recognized by thi~ court as 
high a~thority in Colbert v. Ashland Construction Compom,g, 
' 
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(infra) the authors were apparently ·seeking a short and eon-
cise statement with reference to "bargains in violation of a 
statute," and that they would have welcomed the opportu-
nity of simply declaring all such contracts illegal and void 
but this being impossible, they left the door only slightly 
ajar and without stating the exceptions to the rule left the 
crack wide enough that all may enter; by saying, '' with re-
ference to the iniposition of a penalty or the requirement of 
a license, the rule cannot be so broadly stated. Legislative 
intent m'ltst be sou,qht in ea,ch partic·ula,r case." • * •. 
It is very true that the Legislature can prohibit the mak-
ing of a contract, and that prohibited contracts· are void. 
But in this instance, in the statutes, here un·der considera-
tion, the Legislature has expressed no prohibition. There 
is simply a requirement that a particular class of persons ob-
tain a license and the penalty is 3:gainst the person who fails 
to obtain the license not against the contracts made by sucJ1 
person, nor against his business. 
Appellees, in their brief before the Circuit Court cited two 
cases in which an unlicensed contractor was forbidden the 
. enforcement of his contract in accordance with the ge11-
17• eral rule, *the cases cited are as follows: 
(1) Tennessee Good Roatls Company v. Putman Construc-
tion Company, (1930) 11 Tennesee App. 485 . 
. The Tennessee statute there involved was purely a reve-
nue measure, requiring a privilege tax to be paid by persons 
engaged in the construction of roads, bridges, etc. The de-
fense was the failure to obtain a license. An examination of the case, as reported, and the Tennes-
see Court's opinion ·readily discloses that the matter was 
poorly presented by counsel and ill considered by the Court. 
Counsel for plaintiffs argued that the tax did not apply to 
them as they did not take part in the construction of the 
road; they only laid the asphalt; the court decided that plac-
'i.ng the asphalt on the road was in fact a part of the con-
struction and that, theref~)l'e, the plaintiffs were liable for 
the tax, and in accordance with the g·eneral rule, with no 
mention of its exceptions, held the contract void. 
(2) llu.1J,t v. Dou..qlas Luniber Conipan,y (1933) 41 Arizona, 
276, 17 P. (2nd) 815. 
Here the validity of the contract ent'ered by an unlicen~cd 
contractor, was not under consideration, but the court did 
state that an unlicensed contractor's· agreement as to U1e 
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construction of a building was unenforceable as against the 
owner of the premises . 
. However, the Arizona statute under consideration was a 
regulatory· measure and truly within the police power; the 
holding of the court was altogether correct. · 
The Arizona statute provided in part: 
That applicants for licenses should submit to a registrar 
of contractors, on proper forms, a full description of their 
business and its owners, and the certificates of two reputable 
citizens of the county that the applicant is of good moral re-
putation and recommending that the license be granted. The 
fee for the ·first year is $25.00 which is to be deposited in 
a special contractors license fund and used to carry out the 
· provisions of the act. Licenses are renewable •on pay-
18* ment of a yearly fee of $10.00. A register of applica-
tions and licenses to be maintained in Phoenix and 
open to the public. Any person may file a complaint that a 
contractor has been guilty of; (a) abandonment of ~ contract 
without legal cause; (b) diversion of funds received under a 
contract to any purpose not in accordance with the terms of 
· the contract, with intent to defraud creditors or the owner; 
(c) any fradulent act as a contractor by which another is 
substantially injured; and ( d) wilful and deliberate disre-
gard of the building· codes, the safety or the labor laws of the 
state. 
Upon the filing of a complaint the registrar is under the 
duty of investigating it, and may upon proper showing, 
suspend or cancel the license. When a license is cancelled, 
it cannot be renewed except on proper showing that all loss 
caused by the conduct for which the license was cancelled, 
has been satisfied. 
' Here we find a statute designed exclusively as a police 
measure so drawJ1 as to limit the persons entering the field; 
as contractors to·· those who are honest and of good reputa-
tion, a~d providing protection for' the .Public. And, an unli-
censed contractor, in the State of Arizona, could not make 
a legal or a valid contract because as to him the very act of 
contracting was illegal. But this ·is not the case in Virginia; 
in this Commonwealth, the Legislature has not seen fit to 
provide for any sort of regulation of contractors, nor has it . 
declared the contracts of unlicensed persons to be void, but 
to the contrary has expressly indicated its anticipation of 
contracting by unlicensed persons. In Virginia, unlicensed 
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contracting 'is not prohibjted, either expressly or by implica-
tion, it is only that a tax is demanded of contractors and the 
failure to pay .the tax is the offense for which the penalty 
attaches. 
We have found another case in which an unlicensed con-
tractor was denied the enforcement of his contract; viz: 
. Holm v. Brammell, 67 P. (2nd) 114 (1937) District Court 
of Appeals, 3rd District, California. 
· In this case, however, the statute upon wllich the decision 
was based read as follows: 
''No person engaged in the business or acting in the capa-
city of a contractor as defined by section 3 of this act, shall 
bring or maintain any action in any court of this state 
19• for the collection of or compensation *for the perform-
ance of any act for which a license is required by this 
act without alleging and proving that such person was a 
duly licensed contractor at the time the alleged cause of 
action arose.' ' · 
The language of the California statute is clear and unequi-
vocal, regardless· of the .purpose of the statute, there is no 
doubt that the California Legislature intended contracts by 
unlicensed persons to be unenforceable. 
But, such an intent \vas not expressed by the 'Virginia Le-
gislature, in the statutes under consideration, and such an 
intent can not be implied when the statute is plainly a reve-
nue measure only. 
The statute, which it is alleged this contract violates, does 
not prohibit the contract expressly or by implication and is 
nothing more than a revenue measure, the rule to be followed 
in such cases was laid down by the Supreme Court of Iowa 
as follows: 
Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa 546 (1873): 
This case involved the validity of the sale of certain lots 
of land sold in violation of a statute providing penalties for 
such sales prior to the ackno,vledgement and recordation of 
· a plat of the lots. 
. . 
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The Court held the 'sale valid and in its opinion, said: 
"There is no doubt that the well settled general rule is 
that where a statute prohibits or attaches a penalty to the 
doing of an act, the act is void and will not be enforced, nor 
will the law assist one to recover money or property which 
he h3cs expended in the unlawful execution of it: or, in other 
words, a penalty implies a prohibition though there are ·no 
prohibitory words in the statute; and the prohibition makes 
the act illegal and void. 
But notwithstanding this general rule, it must be appar-
ent to every legal mind, that when a statute annexes a pen-
alty for the doing of an act, it does not always imply such a 
prohibition as will render the act void. Suppose for in-
stance, the act itself expressly provided the penalty annexed 
should not have the effect of rendering the act void. Surely 
in such case the courts would not give such force to the legal 
implication, under the general rule above-quoted, as to over-
rule the express negation of it in the statute itself. Then 
upon this conclusion we are prepared for the next step, 
which is equally plain, that if it is manifest from the langu-
age of the statute, or from the subject matter and the 
20• plain intent *of it, that the act was not to be made void, 
but only to punish the person doing it by ·the penalty 
prescribed, it is equally clear that the courts would readily 
construe the. statute in accordance with its language and 
plain intent. 
We are, therefore, brought to the true test, which is, that 
while, as a gtmeral rule, a penalty implies a prohibition, yet 
the courts will always look to the language of the statute, 
the subject matter of it, the wrong· or evil which it seeks to 
remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought. to be accom-
plished by its enactment, and if from all these, it is manifest 
that it was not intended to imply a prohibition or to render 
the prohibited act void, the cour'ts will so hold, and construe 
the statute accordingly.'' 
Demonstrating this court's recognition of the soundness of 
the Iowa Court's rule are the cases of: 
• (1) Watters and Martin v,. Homes Corporation, 136 Vir-
ginia 114 ( 1923) sy llabns, page 115 : 
'' To the general rule that a contract made in violation of 
a statute is void, th~re are exceptions based upon a supposed 
intent of the leg·islature. The courts should always look to 
( I·) (> 
.l; ~J 
·c ' 
: .. ' ·. i·) 
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the 'language of ·the sta;tute, .the subject matter, the wrong it 
seeks. to prevent, and the purpose to be accomplished by its 
enactment; and if from :these: it is· manifest that it was not 
intended to render an act in centravention of the statute 
void, the courts will so hold.'' :And, 
. (2) Colbert v. Ashland. Construction Co.mpar,;y, 176 Vir, 
ginia 500 (1940). Syllabus, page 501: 
·. "Where th~ 'statute imposes a penalty for the doing of 
an act with9ut prohiHiting it oi·. expressly deblarihg it illegai 
or void, the, q~estion is ohe of legislative intent, and tbe 
cotirts will look to the language of the statute, the subject 
matter of it, the-wrong or evil.which it seeks to remedy, o~· 
p;revent, the p~rpose sought to be accomplished in its enact-
ment; and if from all these, it is manifest that it was not in-
tended to imply a prohioition or to render; the. prohibited act 
void; the courts ·will so hold and ·will construe the statute, 
accordingly." :'. · · · .: 1 ·,· • .: · · 
. . . tl . . ; 
· By the application of the above rule, to the statutes in 
question, w_e :find : : ; : . 
(a) The subject matter of the· statute is, tax. 
·, (b) No wrong or evil is. sough\ to be_ prevented. 
· ( c) 'l'he purpos·e sought to be accomplished by its enact-
ment is the collection of the tax. 
21'"' * ( cl) T.he· ·statute ~u question, showh1g·. an antici~ 
. pation of contracting by unlicensed persons and neither 
in express terms nor. by implicati9n_ pi·ohibiting suQh c~.mtra~t; 
cannot be cpnsirued a~. renderh;ig s-u~h _cont:ra~ts void and 
11~enfo;rGeal>l~. · 
J:m:,the case of Massie v. Dudley, 173 Virginia, 42 (supra). 
. This court held that an unlicens·ed real estate broker could 
'not recover a· commission on the sale of real estate. But in 
so doing correctly fou~d t~at the st~tute requirin~ a license 
of real estate brokers was an exercise· of the pohce power; 
the court said: (pag~ 55). . . .. , 
:·· ' ' The regulation is· a"n e'xercise .:of tlie police powe~ and not 
merely a revenue measure·. '' 
CONCLUSION. 
The fact that a party bargains to do that which will be 
illegal unless certain other steps are taken does not make 
the bargain itself illegal; the illegality enters ",ith the omis-
• 
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· aio~ of th~ other r@qttiretl st~ps. '!'_lie btirgaih i~ nut pftt-
llibit:etl, oth~r. ttiattijrs affl requli~ea; t11e \fi@Iati@fi of th~ stft.t:. 
ttte is in offti~sithi, not ih cbmlftissi@ft. 'rh~ 6mlssion; ill. 
tlii~ instafl~e, oc~uts ill failttre te _obtain t~@ license; tlie ohlY 
commission is in the entering of" the barghlft ~hi~h is n~ith@i' 
.prphiQjted n~r illegal. . 
~µ the li~1H 6f the staiut~s ~ere c_oiisltlered, contracting 
without a license is neither 11tatum Ht se rtol' 1lUWivm 1Wb:. 
hipitu,rn;_ The act of ~ontracting is not evil in ~tself µor pro-
hibited by si~bite. No _prohihitioi:l _nor. penalcy is µnp0sed 
liptfa the business ; but tlie prohipition i.~ pl~ced ·0:ricy upon 
. the person engagt~1g in it .. The hlow .~s dir~ted against the 
persen to assure th~ .colle~tioft of. t4e lie~µse . t~~- . 
The stittlih~ req11iring eontraetet·s in Virgini~ t~ obta1.n .a 
licen~e is pl)rely a rev:enue measur~; and, this ceuttl 
2fa' together 1i1c'Yith courts in tlle ~~jority o~ other _juris~ 
, ~fotions, tl,te le~ding texts; __ aµd Restatement ef the liaw el 
Oontracts is folly in accord in recognizing the eK!2eption t0 
· the gene:r:al rule; that, when it is found that a statute, re-
qaifibg tlf a ulass t>f l)~rsOfis n. lie·ehse) if! in no w~y tlesighed 
to fall within the police power of the state, b\lt \hltt i~ eilttt!t:. 
ment was intended merely as a revenue .measure, oontraets 
made by unHcens~d persons ate hot, bi laclt ot tp.e license, 
reilderecl void flnd unei1/orceable. in a court of ilistice\ 
it is, tllerefore, respectfully subipittec1 tna.t ih~ c~urt erred 
and. for the er~or_ ass~·iled. app,ella~nts are ~iilitlea to have 
the ·case ren)hnded .to the Oii·cuit Court of Fairf~:i: County 
f0r trial on its merits~ 
For the fof~·ohJ,Q,· reasnns; you.1\. p_eHUonets pray t4ai aii 
appeal . may be awarded your petitioners from the aecre~ 
complained of. · · 
FORMAL ~TA'l'EMENi'. 
·. (l) ~titioners ad0pi this petition >cis their t}pening brief, 
('2) In t!f}ttforlliit)" *ith Ru.le 9 of this enttrt, it is stated 
that the appellants are Earl H. W ell~s; .J1e'dnard C. We-Iles; 
and Richard H. V/ elles, and the appellees, or parties of 
r~c'oYd who wiil b~ h1te~sted ih s\isb\.ihihg the tl~eree of the 
court below or affected by a revershl ih@reof, are .Edge.t W. 
Revercomb and Ethel F. Nagle. 
(3) Your petitioners request an urill presentation of this 
• petitio~. . . . . . r-· ( 4) Thi$ "f)~titi'6h will be filed wi.Ui the Clerk c>'f ih~ Su-
!1f'efue flm.1ft tlf Ai)p'eM's at hiicb~ofid, and a ~opy w-&s man~d. 
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to Hardee Chambliss, Jr.,. Fairfax,- Virginia, opposing 
con:nsel. in t~e co~rt b~low on the ~4th ~aY. of ~ovember, 1~48. 
- • • .•• I • j. • ..... • ~ '4·:. J ,.,._ • t. i, I 
WILLIAM W. MAY 
Manassas, Virginia 
Counsel. 
. -EARL -H. WELLES 
. ::•LEONARD' C:-··WELLES 
RICHARD- H .. · WELLES 
By Counsel. 
. ~ ' . . , . ; ~. ~ 
~ I; -~bert .A~ Hu:tchison, a~ ~tf~~l!-ey, ~ra,~ti~.ing in t~~ ~u-
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VIB#IN'IA: 
:-·' ,Ple~sJwfor~ ,t4A ij:911,o~~ble rau_l ~~ ~:t;'O~,, /µ~g:e J{ t~e 
tha -0.~rc-qit, Qqurt _o(;lfaj.rf~~ . ..Qovnty, Y~r~ni~; :at~, C~.r~mt 
Court held for said County, at the Courthouse thereof, on 
Monday, the 30th day of August, 1948. 
E. H. Welles, Leonard C. '\Velles, and Richard H. '\V elles, 
partners, trading under the sty le and firm name of-
Welles Engineering Company, 
v. 
Edgar W. Revercomb and Ethel F. Nagle. 
24 . Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
IN CHANCERY NO. 7203. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 1st day 
of J-qne, 1948, came the Complainant, by counsel, and filed 
in the Clerk's Office of said Court their Bill of Complaint, in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 2 } To: The Honorable Paul E. Browii, Judge of said 
Court: 
Your orators respectfully represent: 
(1) That they are a partnership trading under the style 
and firm name of Welles Engineering Company, with its 
principal office in the Town of Vienna, Virginia,'· and com-
posed of the following persons: to-wit: 
(a) E. H. Welles 
(b) Leonard C. Welles and 
( c) Richard H. Welles. 
(2) That their busfness among other enterprises, consists 
of designing, remodeling and constructing homes and build-
ings of various uses. · 
(3) That on the 18th day of November, 1947, your orators 
entered a contract with Edgar W. Revercomb, the defendant, 
herein to do, on a cost phis basis, certain construction work 
on his property located' in Providence Magisterial District · 
of Fairfax County, Virginia. A true copy of the said con-
tract which is embodied -in a letter, bearing date of Novem-
ber 18, 1947, from your orators to Edgar W. Revercomb and _ 
which was duly accepted by Edga.r W. Revercomb, is at-
tached hereto marked ''Exhibit A'' and prayed to be read 
as part of this bill. 1 ( 4) That in accordance with the terms of said contract, 
your orators did furnish the following materials and labor 
to the said Edgar W. Revercomb at the prices mentioned: 
· E. H. Welles, et als., v. Edgar W. Revercomb, et als. 25 
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Week Labor & Materials Cost Per Tote.I of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits ForWeek 
Nov. 26, 
1947 Labor 
Payroll $143.30 
Social Security & Insurance 8.60 
. $151.90 
Truck-four (4) hours 10.00 
Plan and Permit 25.00 
Materials 
4 pcs. 2"x6"x10'-o" 
40'BM 
22 pcs. 
211 x811 xlO' -011 
295' BM 
Sheeting 15001 BM 
Miscellaneous 2001 BM 
2033' BM 172.81 
15 squares-shingle 97.50 
1200 811x8"x16"Block 240.00 
100 bags bessemer mortar 70.00 
6 barn door lintels 52.50 
6 tom sand 15.00 
647.81 
834.71 
Paid (by error) 863.71 
$29.00 
$863.71 
Dec. 3, 
1947 Labor 
Payroll $111.88 
Social Security & Insurance 6.71 
118.54 
Truck-three (8) hours 7.50 
Saw 1 day 5.00 
House plans-E. H. Welles 20.00 
Materials 
3 cubic yds. concrete 34.50 
100 pcs. 
211x4"xs' --0" 667' BM 
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: Week 
'Eii6ing 
Dec. 10, 
Labor &\·Materials 
'Furnished 
·· r Cost';Per .:. · Tot&I of 1 ·:Less Tota.l-:iPa.id 
· •,{Item Items ,. Credits For W.eek 
65 pcs. 
Z'xF/'xlS'-o" 1560' BM. 
6p~. 
2"xS"xS'-o' 64' BM 
64 pcs. 
Z'x8"xl6'-0" 0 i366' BM 310.85 
345t35 
496.39· 
$496.39 
1947 Labor 
Dec. 17, 
1947 
Payroll 
Social Security & Insurance 
271'. 75 
16'.80 
Truck-I hour 
Sa.w-2 da.ys 
--- ':'.:','288.05 
· .. ··2.50 
!'• 10.00 
Materials 
80--411x8"xl61 -
cinder blocks 
50-Concrete Brick 
12-42''lintels . 
6 tons sand 
3 cubic yards·~oncrete 
Labor 
Payroll . 
Social Security & Insurance 
Truck-three ~3} hours 
Sa.w-1 da.y 
Materials 
lOOpcs. 
16.00 
1.50 
--·24.00 
15.00 
34.50 
;·,-~ 252.20 
15.13 
111x611xl0'-0" 380' BM " 42.50 
500' BM-T&G roofers 
(doors 85.00 
1 4''x4"x14'-o" 1. 70 
275 S"x8"xl611 
cinder blocks 55. 00 
91.00 
391.55 
267.33 
I ,) 7.50 
5.00 
$391.55 
E. EL W~U~St et als,J V, Edgar w. &•irgomb, et als. 27 
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Weck Labor & Materials Uost Per Total of l!eeB Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item ltelb! Greth'l:a For Week 
Bolts, nuts cl wtihers 3.00 
45 lbs. 20 nails 2.40 
Roofing nails 11.96 
3 rolls paper 10.50 
6 tons sand 15.00 
$228.06 
$507.89 
neb. 24, 
1947 Labor 
Payroll 355.50 
Social Security & Insurance 21.33 
$376.83 
Truck-1 hour 2.50 
Saw-2 days 10;00 
Materials 
6 tons sand 15.00 
Other item8 I 
Premium on insurance 
policy 66.00 
470.33 
$470.33 
Dec. 31, 
1947 Labor 
Payroll 162.08 
Social Security & Insurance 9.72 
$171.80 
Truck-~ hours 5.00 
Saw-1 day 5.00 
Material.8 
12 pcs. 
160' BM 211 xS" x 10' -011 13.60 
100 lbs. Bondex 18.00 31.60 
213 .. 40 
$213.40 
28 Supreme Col;ll't of App~~ls of Virginia 
Ja.n. 7, 
1948 Labor 
Payroll . 220.80 
Social Security & JDS\ll'ance 13.25 
$234.0l;> 
Truck-10 hours ·25.06 
Sa.w-1 da.y 5.00 
E. ~. Welles, Staking 
out 1'ouse 10.00 
.. ; 
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Week Labor & Me.terials Cost.Per Total of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
Materials 
Ste.ble door hinges 
& latches 2.31 
Bl~e 'prints .54 
4 gallons-c~099te pa.int 11.80 
14.65 
\ 
l. 288.70 
$288.70 
Jan. 15, 
1948 Labor 
Payroll 315.75 
Social Security & Insurance 18.95 
$334.70 
Truck-8 hours 20.00 
' 
I• 
Materials 
1 pc. 4"~411xl4'-0" 1.90 
118' BM 
211x12" &211xlO" 
@$100.00 
2520' BM Z'x8" 
11.80 
·@$90.00 226.80 
2088' BM 211~6" 
@$89.00 (' 185.83 
1~26'~M 2"x4" 
~87. 106.66 
3120' BM l"x6" 
@$92.00 287.04 
4 door frames .20.00 
1200 4"x8"xl6" 
cinder blocks @14c 168.00 
700 s"x8"xt6" 
cinder blocu @19c 133.00 
1141.03 
1495.73 
$1495.73 
E. H. Welles, ·et als., v. Edgar W. Revercomb, et als. 29 
Jan. 21, 
1:948 Labor 
Payroll 249.00 
Socia.I Security & Insurance 17.94 
$266.94: 
Truck-2 hours s~oo 
Saw-1 day a.oo 
Maleriafs 
Jack Columns 17.90 
Cemant & Calcium chloride 4.50 
Glass 5.40 
'3 bags cement 2.00 
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Wook Labor & Materials Cost Per Total of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits FGrWeek 
3 base grills 2.55 
Large Lintels '99.00 
Steel windows '359.50 
10 pcs. 
1061 BM 211 xS" xS' -O" 
60 pcs. 
211x4"xlO' -011 400'BM 
506' BM 44.02 
124 S"x7'~x1611 
cinder blocks 23.56 
2,000 bricks 74.00 
100 fire brick 10.00 
60 lin. ft. flue lining 80.00 
100 bags mortar 80.00 
6 tons sand 15.00 
Rotary damper & 
ash dump 15.50 
33 small lintels 66.00 
6 cubic yds. concrete 74.11 
983.04 
Sub-Contract.ors 
Masonry to Jan. 23, 1948 250.00 
1509.98 
$1509.98 
30 Supreme Oo-µrt of Appeals of Virginia 
Jan. 28, 
1948 Labor 
Payroll 235.35 
Social Security & Insurance 14.12 
$249.47 
Truck-2 hours 5.00 
Sa.w-1 day 5.00 
Materials 
Stable door track 
and hangars 39.6S 
Bolts & washers 6.58 
Bolts & washers 2.88 
100 lbs. Bondex 15.00 
8 42 inch lintels 16.00 
6 tons sand 15.00 
Slate 1.20 
· 3520.sq. ft. rock la.th 123.20 
3440 brick 127.28 
346.82 
· Bub-Contractor 
Masonry Jan. 23, 
1948 to Jan. 30, 1948 300.00 
906.29 
S906.29 
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Week Labor & Materials Cost.Per Tota.I of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
Feb. 4, 
__ 1948 Labor 
Payroll $360.05 
Social Security & Insurance 21.60 
381.65 
Truck--4 hours 10.00 
Saw-1 day 5.00 
Materials 
6 tons sand 15.00 
1 Keg 6D. nails 8.00 
1 61-611 steel lintel 5.75 
49 Jin. ft. stable door track 13.20 
22 sq. asbestos shingles, 
felt and nails 231.28. 
360 ft. BM 2"x811@$90.00 32.40 
510 ft. BM 211x4"@$87.00 44.37 
2230 ft. BM 1'!x6"@$92.00 205.16 
1000 brick 37.00 
592.16 
E. H. Welles, et als., v. Edgar W. Revercomb, et als. 31 
' 
Sub-Contracwr 
Masonry Jan. 30, 1948 
to Feb. 6, 1948 250.00 
Retained percentage 
Stahle 450.00 
1688.81 
Feroentage retained $460.00 
$1238.81 
Feb. 11, 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $139.50 
Social Security & Insurance 8.37 
147.87 
Truck-four hours 10.00 
Saw-one-half day 2.50 
Feb. 11, 
1948 Materials 
,10,500 brick @$37.00 $388.50 
548.87 
Less M alerials N oi used 
10 pcs. 2" x4" x8'-0" 
53 feet BM @$87.00 4.61 
page. 9 ~ 
Week Labor & Materials Cost Per Total of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
4 pcs. I"x6"x8'-0" 
32 feet BM @$92.00 2.94 
7.55 
541.32 
Note: Paid Following Week 
Feb. 18, 
1948 Labor 
Payroll for week ending, 
Feb. 11, 1948 $139.50 
Payroll for week ending, 
Feb. 18, 1948 . 158.25 
Social Security & Insurance 17.87 
$815.62 
Truck-5 hours 12.50 
Sa.w-one-half day 2.50 
Materials 
10,500 brick @$37.00 388.50 
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
100 bags mortar 80.00 
25 lbs. bondex 5.00 
Stable door handles 
& latches 4.16 
2 cubic yards concrete 23.00 
$500.66 
Sub-Contractors 
Masonry-Feb. 6-1948, to 
Feb. 21, 1948 525.00 
Blea, Trench Madine 65.00 
590.00 
1421.28 
Credits 
10 pcs. 2"x4"x8'-rf' 4.61 
4 pcs. l"x6"x8'-ri' 2.94 
7.55 
1413.73 
Less Shingles returned 223.00 
Sl190.73 
Sl190. 73 
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Week Labor & Materials Cost Per Total of ~- Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
Feb. 2Q, 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $310.40 
Social Security & Insurance 18.62 
S329.02 
Truck-I hour 2.50 
Saw-~days \0.00 
Materials 
920 sq. ft. rock wool 64.40 
1200lin. ft. furring 18.00 
24 tons gravel 72.00 
6 tons 15.00 
$169.40 
Suh-Contractor 
Masonry-Feb. 21, 1948, 
to Feb. 28, 1948 400.00 
Plumber 75.00 
475.00 
985.92 
$985.92 
E. H. Welles, et als., v. Ed~r W. Revercomb, et ala.. 33 
March 3 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $'274.40 
Social Securlty & Insunmce 16.46 
$290.86 
Truck- 1 hour 2.50 
Saw--4 days '20.00 
Ma·erials 
12 tons gravel '33.00 
30 lin. ft. 411 
B&S sewerpipe 6.60 
"30 lin. ft. drain & specials '35.00 
1 roll paper 3.50 
'78.10. 
Sub-Contmclor 
Plumbing,· roughing 
in & material 326.00 
716.46 
Less Bathroom Credit 75.00 
$641.46 
$'641.46 
puge 11 r 
Week L'abor & Materials Cast Per Total ot l;ess Tota.I Pa.id 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
March 10 
1948 Lobur 
Payroll 1323.70 
Social Security & Insurance 19.42 
$343.12 
Truck-2 hours 5.00 
Saw-2days 10.00 
Materials 
500 lin. ft. 1"x12'' 
shelving @17e 85.00 
3 sq. asbestos ' 
siding shingles 27.25 
63 lbs. copper flaBhing 84.65 
6 tons gravel 16.50 
6 tons sand 13.50 
$176.90 
!4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Bub-ContraclmB 
Plumbing-withheld 
last week 75.00 
Glazing 79.00 
154.00 
689.02 
$689.02 
March 17 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $255.30 
. So'cial Security & Insurance 15.32 
$270.6-2 
Truck-I hour 2.50 
Saw-1 day 5.00 
Materials 
560 lin. ft. U round 8.40 
25 sq. asphalt shingles 162.50 
6 roUs roofing felt 21.00 
1 roll 1011 copper 38.50 
1 gal. linseed oil 3.25 
2 qts. shellac 2.50 
1 qt. thinner .35 
3--4" vitrified pipe tees 3.00 
$239.50 
517.62 
$517.62 
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Week Labor & Materials Cost Per Total of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
Ma.rch 24 , 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $239.98 
Social Security & Ins, 14.40 
$254.38 
Truck-2 hours 5.00 
Saw-1 day 5.00 
Materials 
Comer heads for plastering 19.86 
Sub-Contracts 
Electrical, roughing in 100.00 
$384.24 
$384.24 
E. H. Welles, et als., v. Edgar W. Revercomb, et als. 35 
March 31 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $193.98 
Social Security & Insurance 11.64: 
$205.57 
Truck-2 hours 5.00 
Material:s 
32 bags handwall @$1.10 '35.20 
20 bags finish lime @$1.38 27.60 
6 tons plaster sand 15.00 
1 roll acid core solder 1.00 
3 bags gauging @$1.40 4.20 
83.00 
293.57 
$293.57 
April 7 
1948 Labor 
Payroll $ 85.40 
Social Security & In~rance 5.12 
$ 90.52 
Materials 
5 bags cement 5.00 
Sub-Contracls 
Plasterer-brown coat 200.00 
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Week Labor & Materials Cost Per Total of ~ Total Pa.id 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
Tile 170.00 
370.00 
$465.52 
Credit (return~d) 
20 811 xS" xl6" cinder block 4.00 
70 brick 2.80 
6.80 
458.72 
$458.7~ 
36 Supreme Co11rt of Appeals of Virginia 
April 14 
1948 Labor 
PayrolJ $134.85 
Social Security & Insurance- 8.09 
$142.94 
Welles Truck,. 1 hour 2.50 
Craig truck-hauling 
steel 1 hour 3.00 
April ~4 
1948 Materials 
396 lbs. %" rein steel 27.7'l 
362 lbs. Y2" rein st.eel 44.96 
280 lb~. Ys" .rein st.eel 25.20 
4 cubic yards concrete 44.20 
· 6 pair, ~, butts 4.32 
Nails 10.00 
$156.40 
8ub-Contracror 
Plasterer-balance 105.00 
Tile-balance 55.00 
160.00 
160.00 
$464.84 
Credit. (returned) 
28 4"xS"x16"Cinder block 3.36 
• $461.48 
$4(il.48 
April 21 
1948 Labor 
Payroll 152.10 
Social Security & Insurance~ 9.13 
$161.23 
Truck-2 hours 5.00 
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. Week Labor & Mat.erials Cost Per Total of Less Total Paid 
Ending Furnished Item Items Credits For Week 
Materials 
From Welles Stock: 
3 pea. 2'-8"x6'-8" interior 
. doors @$13.50 40.50 
2-2' -0"x6' -8" interior 
doors @$13.50 27.00 
E. H. Welles, et als., v. Edgar W. Revercomb, et al& J7 
April 21 
1948 
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Week 
Ending 
2 door fi:ames @$3.90 
10 5[4x10"x3' -011 oak 
treads @$3.25 
4 3/4i8"x3'-01' oak 
risers @$2.00 
:2 bags cement 
From Murphy & Ames: 
1 21 -611 x6' -811 interior door 
' 3 door frames @$3.25 
1 5/4xlO"x3' -O" oak tread 
10 3/4x4x8~x3'-o~' oak 
risers @$2.00 
:2 5/4x911x4'-o" pine 
treads @$2.10 
8 5/4x9"x5'-o" pine 
treads @$1.60 
11 3/4x9"x3'-o" pine 
risers @$ .52 
700' BM white oak flooring 
first grade @$300.00 
7.80 
32.50 
'8.00 
1.90 
13.60 
9.75 
3.25 
'20.00 
4.20 
12.80 
5.72 
210.00 
From George M~ Yeatman & Sons: 
Swing door floor hardware 2.50 
From Vn-ginia Concrere Co: 
12CY 1 :2:4 Concrete 
@$11.50 138.00 
Credits 
200 lbs. sand 
200 lbs, gravel 
.25 
.30 
Payment of bill submitted for week 
ending April 21, 1948, refused by de-
f endant and the following listed items 
were removed from the premises: 
Labor & Materials 
Furnished 
MaterialR~ 
From Welles Stock: 
3 pcs. 2'-8"x6'-8'' interior 
doors @$13.50 
2 2' -O" x6' $' interior 
doors @$13.50 
Cost Per 
Item 
$ 40.50 
27..00 
1637.62 
703.75 
s. ,55 
$703.20 
Total of 
Items 
Less Total Paid 
Credits For Week 
·38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
2 door frames @$3.90 
10 5/4xlO"x3' -011 oak 
treads @$3:25 
4 3/4x8"x3'-o" oak 
risers @$2.00 
l 2' -6"x6' -1!/' interior door 
3 door frs.mes @$3.25 
I 5/4xl01/x3/-0I/ oak tread 
10 3/4x8M"x3'-o" oa.k 
risers @$2.00 
2 5/4x911x5'-0" 
pine treads @S2.10 
8 5/4x9"x5' -011 pine 
treads @$1.60 
11 3/4x9"x3'-o" pine 
risers @$ .52 
· 700' BM white oak flooring 
· ·first grade @$300.00 
Swing door hardware 
7.80 
32.50 
8.00 
13.60 
9.75 
3.25 
20.00 
4.20 
12.80 
5.72 
210.00 
2.50 
$397.62 
DUE BUT UNPAID .............. ••... . .. .. . . . . . .. . • . S 305.58 
April 22, 
1948 a.nd 
April 23, 
1948 Labor $157.20 
60.00 
15.00 
100.00 
page 16 ~ 
Week 
Ending 
Plumber's percentage 
Electricians percentage 
Mason's payment 
$332.20 
DUE BUT UNPAID .................................. . 
Total cost, subject to 15% .............................. . 
15% due Welles Engineering Co ......................... . 
Less Total Credits $479 ,00 
Amount due for work done ............................. . 
S 332.20 
14643.32 
2196.49 
1717.49 
La.bot & Materials 
Furnished 
Cost Per Total of Less Total Paid 
Item Items Credits For Week 
PLUS 
Unpaid bill of 
April 21, 1948 $305. 58 
April 22, 1948 and 
April 23, 1948 332. 20 
$637.78 
To: E. H. Welles, for plans 300. 00 
937.78 
GRAND TOTAL DUE: Welles Engineering Company...... $2655.27 
I 
E. H .. Welles, et als., v. Edgar W. Revercomb, et als. 39 
(5) That said materials and labor were ·used in the im-
provement and construction of a garage, stable and dwell-
mg house located on the real estate of the said Edgar W. 
Revercom b in Providence Magisterial District of Fairfax 
County, Virginia, which real estate is more particularly de-
scribed as follows: 
BEGINNING at the intersection of the northeast side of 
the Georgetown Pike with the southeast side of a 15 foot 
outlet road for the Dr. Howze and Boatwright properties 
and being on the northwest side of a 10 foot outlet for Grin-
age; thence with the said side of the Howze and Boatwright 
outlet and the said side of the Grinage outlet, N. 42° 11' E., 
269.22 feet to the corner of Zollinger; thence with the line. 
of Zolling·er, S. 51 ° 45' E., 212.25 feet to the line of Robin-
son; thence with the line of Ro binsqn, s~ 41 ° 25' W., 263 feet 
to the pipe on the said side of the Georg·etown Pike; thence 
with the side of the pike, N. 53° 20' W., 216.26 feet to the be-
ginning, containing 1.305 acres. 
{6) That by deed dated the 22nd day of January, 1948, 
and, on said date, recorded among the land records of Fair-
fax County, Virgfoia, in deed book 604, pag·e 348, Edgar W. 
Revercomb conveyed the a hove-described property to Wal-
ter T. Oliver, Jr., who by deed of even date therewith, duly 
of record in Deed Book 604, pag·e 350 of said land records 
reconveyed same to the said Edgar W. Revercomb and said 
Ethel F. Nagle, as joint tenants with common law rights of 
survivorship. . 
(7) That within ten (10) days from the 23rd day of April, 
1948, the date your orators ceased to furnish said 
page 17 ~ materials and labor as aforesaid,, they caused to 
be recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of the County of Fairfax· and State of Virginia, a no-
tice of lien as provided by statute, stating that your orators 
claimed a lien upon said property of the said Edgar W. 
Revercomb to secure the payment of the sum of Two Thou-
sand Four Hundred Ninety Dollars and Eighty-nine cents 
($2,490.89) together with a description of the property in-
tended to be covered by the said lien sufficiently adequate 
for the identification with the name of the owner of the said 
property as above-described; that the said account was sub. 
scr.ibed and swo1;n to by E. H. Welles, agent of your oratQJ."~, 
and was recorded in Miscellaneous Lien Book No. 12, page 
260, in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Fairfax, 
aforesaid, as required by law; all of which will more fully 
40 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
appear from a copy of the said notice of mechanic's lien filed 
herewith, marked Exhibit "B" and asked to read as part of 
this bill. · 
(8) That this suit to enforce the mechanic's lien aforesaid 
was commenced by a praecipe in the said Clerk's· Office on 
or before the 1st day of June, 1948, and within two months 
from the filing of the said account with the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court ·aforesaid. 
(9) That your orators now charge that there is now due 
and owing to them the sum of Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Fifty-five Dollars and· Twenty-seven Cents ($2,655.27) as 
shown by the itemized statement above; that no part ther~of 
has been paid by the said Edgar W. Revercomb and that 
same is a yalid and subsisting lien against the land, pi:op-
.. erty and appurtanances thereon, hereinbefore de-
pag~ 18 ~·scribed. 
Your orators therefore pray that the said 
Edgar W. Revercomb and Ethel F. Nagle, may be made 
parties defendant to this bill and required to answer the 
same though not under oath, answer under oath being ex-. 
pressly waived; that proper process issue; that your orators' 
debt may be properly ascertained; that the property afore-
said may be sold to pay off and satisfy your orators' claim 
for the sum of $2,655.27 with interest thereon from the 23rd 
day of April, 1948, after the liens on the said property and 
their priorities' have been duly ascertained, and that your 
orators may have all such further and general relief as in 
equity. may seem meet and the nature of their cause may re.: 
quire, and as in duty bound they will ever pray. 
WELLES ENGINEERING COMP ANY 
(signed) By E. H. "\¥ELLES 
WILLIAM W. MAY (signed) 
Counsel. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Fairfax, to-wit: 
E. H. Welles, being· first duly sworn .upon oath says, that 
he is agent for the Welles Engineering Company for the pur-; 
pose of making this affidavit; that the facts and allegations 
contained in the foregoing bill afe true, except as far as they 
are therein stated to be on information, and that so far as they 
are stated to be on information, he believes them to be true. 
(signed} E. H. WELLES, Ag·ent for 
"WELLES ENGINEERING COMP ANY 
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. Taken, sworn and subscribed to before me, a notary pub-
he of and for the County of Fairfax in the State of Virginia 
in my County aforesaid, this 1st of June, 1948. 
(signed) ELIZABETH F. SIMPSON 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires on the 10th day of January, 1951. 
page_ 19 ~ EXHIBIT ''Bt'. 
MEMORANDUM FOR MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIMED 
BY GENERAL CONTRACTOR . 
The Welles Engineering Company, a partnership, with 
headquarters at Vienna, Virginia, claims that Edgar W. 
Revercomb .is indebted to it in the sum of Two· Thousand 
Four. Hundred Ninety Dollars and Eighty-nine· Cents ($2,-
490.89) for work done and materials furnished in and about 
the construction, repair, and improvement of a garage, 
stable and dwelling house on Georgetown Pike, Route #123, 
Providence Magisterial District of Fairfax, Virginia, with 
interest thereon from the 23rd day of April, 1948, until pay-
ment which sum is now due and p~yable, and for which sum 
of $2,490.89 the said Welles Engi.neering· Company claims a 
lien on the following described property of the said Edgar 
W. Revercomb, to-wit: 
BEGINNING at the intersection of" the northeast side of 
the Georgetown Pike with the southeast side of a 15 foot out-
let road for. the Dr. Howze and Boatwright properties and 
being on the northwest side of a 10 foot outlet for Grinage; 
thence with the said side of the Howze and Boatwright out-
let and the said side of the Grinage outlet, N. 42° 11' E., 
269.22 feet to the corner of Zollinger; thence with the line 
of Zollinger, S. 51 ° 45' E., 212.25 feet to the line of Robin-
son; thence with the line of Robinson, S. 41 ° 25' W., 263 feet 
to the pipe on the .said side of the Georgetown Pike; then~e 
with the side of the pike N. 53° 20' W., 216.26 feet to the be· 
ginning, containing 1.305 acres. 
April 28, 1948. 
WELLES ENGINEERING COMPANY 
By E. H. WELLES. 
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State of Virginia, . 
County of Fairfax, to-wit: 
I, ....... ·.; a· notary public in and for the county afore-
. said in the State of Virginia, do certify that E. 
page 20 } H. Welles, a member of the partnership trading 
. , as the Well es Engineering Company, this day 
made oath b'ef ore me in my said county that Edgar W. Rever-
comb is justly .indebted to the said Welles Engineering Com-
pany in the sum of $2,490.89, for the consideration stated 
in the foregoing memorandum, and that the same is payable 
as therein stated. 
My commission expires on the . . day of .... , 19 ... 
Given under my hand this . . day of .... , 1948. 
page 21} J;DXHIBIT ''A'' 
Mr. Edgar W. Revercomb 
517 Nicholson Ave., N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Revercomb: 
Notary Public. 
November 18, 1947 
Ref erring to various interviews and to the plans and 
sketches we have studied:-
We propose to do certain construction work on your prop-
erty on the Georg·etown Pike, Route # 123, in the Providence 
District, Fairfax County, Virginia, as follows : · 
Part A. Make the necessary plats and plans and secure 
required permits. 
Part B. Move the small .garage to a location designated 
by you, placing it on an adequate foundation. 
Part O. Erect a 30' x 40' stable, without interior facilities, 
in accordance with the plans we have prepared, as approved 
~~a . 
Part D. Take down your present house to its basement 
wa1ls storing .all usable materials in the new stable· to be 
sold, re-used, or stored, as you may elect. 
Part E~ Design and erect, on .the site of your present· 
house, a home whose general plan will conform to that of 
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tliE: house,. breezeway and· garage which: you showed· to the 
wri~er on the 16th·. inst. with·, such modification, as. you may. 
desire. 
:we· propose to' do I the foregoing.'·work f~r; actual cost to• us 
plus.: flf.teeu per centt ( 16%) 1 of· such. cost, parable. as follows:= 
On· '.llhursday of each week we will submit to you a- bill, in 
such, detail RS· you desire; for our· cost for, the \\\eek- ending. 
the Wednesday night before; you to pay such bill on that 
day. 
A.s each of the above, desig-nated': Far.ts is complete-I?art 
A to E inolusive--you w.ill' pay us the 15'% of our. cost for 
s-µch Part as evidenced· by the weekly biUs above pr:ovided: 
fu~ . . 
It is- our intent t11at the. entir.e cost to, you of the work }).ere-
inbefore• detailed shall not exceed. the sum: of Fifteen Thou-
sand Four Hund:red Dollars ($15,40(t00). In or.der.~ that th)B 
maximum expenditure limit may be realized, we will confer. 
with you as frequently as· you may desire for the purpose. of· 
analysing the expenditures possihle from. the unexpended 
balance and will be governed by your instructiQns. 
page 22 ~ in this regard. 
We propose to comple.t-e, this wo:vk within five 
( 5) months from the date of thts proposal unless delayed by 
causes beyond our control. 
Should you so desire, we will do any f:l,ddition_al work on 
your property on the same basis as Parts ~ to E inch;isive. 
Very Truly yours, 
WELLES ENGINEERING OOMP.ANY 
By E. H. WELLES. 
Accepted: Edgar W. Revercomb 
Date: _11/19/47. 
page 23 ~ And on ·the 24th day of July, 1948, A Speoial 
Plea was entered in tha Clerk's Office of the Court 
in the words and figures, following, to-wit: 
Come now the defendants, by their attorney, and file this, 
their special plea, to the bill of complaint heretofore filed 
herein against them and respectfully represent unto your 
Honor as follows : · 
That the complainants, E. H. W,elles, Leonard C. Welles, 
and Richard H. Welles, partners, trading under the styl~ and 
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firm name of Welles Engineering Company, should not be· 
allowed to maintain this suit on the following g~ounds: 
1 : That the complainants were not, either individually or 
as a co~pai-tnership, licensed as a contractor as required by 
the provisions of Virginia Tax Code Section 176, at the time 
of the making of the contract, with the defendant, Edgar W. 
Revercomb, which contract is alleged in the bill of complaint, 
and incorporated therein by reference; and which contract 
falls ~thin. the provisions of said 'rax Code Section. 
2: T:J}at the ·complainants failed to comply with the pro-
visions of paragraph 2, of Virginia Code Section 4722, (1) 
in that, as a co-partnership, they failed to sign and aclmowl-
edge a certificate setting forth the full names of each and 
every person composing the co-partnership, with their re-
spective post offices and residence addresses, the name and 
style of the firm, the length of time for which it is to con-
tinue, and the locality of their place of business, and file the 
same in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fair-
fax County, Virginia, that being· the County 
page 24 ~ wherein said business is conducted, and wherein 
the contract sued on herein, was made ; 
3: That the complainants failed to' comply with paragraph 
numbered 1 of said Virginia Code Section 4722 (1) in that 
said co-partnership is trading under the fictitious name of 
Welles Engineering Company, and the complainants com-
posing said firm failed to sign and acknowledge a certificate 
setting forth the name under which such business was to be 
conducted or transacted, and the names of each and every 
person composing the same, with their respective post office 
and residence addresses and file the same in the . office of the 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, that being 
the County wherein the business of said firm is conducted 
and wherein the contract sued on herein was made. 
And the defendants, by their counsel, pray the judgment 
of this Court whether the complainants should be further al-
lowed to maintain this suit. 
EDGAR· W. REVERCO:M:B 
By Counsel. 
ETHEL F. NAGLE 
By Counsel. 
(s'igned) HARDEE CHAMBLISS, JR. 
Defendants' Counsel. 
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State of Virginia, 
County of Fairfax, to-wit: 
This day, Hardee Chambliss, Jr., attorney for the defend-
ants, Edgar W. Revercomb and Ethel F. Nagle, personally 
appeared before me, Ruth A. Mitchell, a Notary Public in 
and for the State and County· aforesaid, and subscribed the 
foregoing and hereunto annexed special plea, and 
page 25'} made oath and affidavit that the matters and 
things therein stated are true to the best of his· 
know ledge and belief .. 
Given under my hand this 24th day of July, 1948. 
(signed) RUTH A. :MITCHELL 
Notary Public as aforesaid 
My commission expires 2/2/50. 
page 26 } And on the 3rd day of August, 1948, a Demurrer 
was entered in the. Clerk's Office of the Court in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
The said complainant says that the special plea in this ac.-
tion is not sufficient in law for the fallowing reasons : 
(1) The license required of contractors by Section 176 of 
Virginia Tax Code is merely a revenue measure, calculated 
to obtain money for the Treasury only. The acts which are 
prohibited by said Tax Code ar.e acts merely mala pro-
hibit'Wm, and not m,oJ,a vn. se, and it was not the irit~nt of 
the legislature that a violator of said act, suffer more than 
the penalties provided for its violation. It was not the in-
tent of the .legislature that a party tQ a contract in violation 
of said statute should be denied legal redress in a court of 
justice on the ground that such contract' was illegal and void: 
Complainant is eng·aged in the business .of pr.ofessional 
engineering and was and is duly licensed as a professional 
engineer. · 
(2) Complainants have now filed the certificate required 
by paragraph 2, Virginia Code S.ection 4722 (1) and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, of said section, 
reading as follows:"• • • provided, how.ev.er, that the failure 
of any person • • • to comply with the provisions of this act 
shall not prevent a recovery by or against such person ~ ~ ~ 
in any of the courts of this state on any cause of 
page 27 } action heretofore or hereafter arising, but no ac-
tion shall .be maintained in any of the courts of 
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this state by any such person ° * *, unless and until the .cer-
tificate required by this act has been filed.'' the said com-
plainant may now proceed with its suit. Bain v. Boykin, 180 
Virginia, 259. . 
. (3) Complainant denies that it is subject to the provisions 
of paragraph 1, of Section 4722, (1), Code of Virginia, re-
quiring the filing of a certificate by persons conducting a 
business under an assumed name in that the name, "Welles 
Engineering Company'', complies with the rule stated in 
Tate v. Atlanta Oak Flooring Company, 17H Vfrginia, 365, 
reading as follows: 
"Where the designation under which a business is being 
conducted consists of the surname of the proprietor or pro-
prietors . with the addition of the words 'and company' or ' & 
Co', preceded by a word descriptive of the nature of the busi-
ness, the name is not within the statutes.'' Nevertheless 
complainant has now filed such certificate and the lack of 
sanie can no longer be urged as an objectic;m. 
( sig'lled) WILLIAM W. M.A. Y, p. q. 
page 28 ~ And on the 3rd day of August, 1948, a Decree 
was entered in the Clerk's Office of the Court in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
This cause came on this 3rd day of August, 1948, to be 
heard upon the memorandum of mechanic's lien heretofore 
filed by the complainants, upon the bill of complaint to en-
force said lien filed by them, upon the special plea of the de-
fendants to said bill of complaint, and upon the demurrer to 
said special plea filed by the complainants; and upon argu-
ment of counsel: 
And it appearing to the Court, after consicleratton of said 
special plea and the demurrer thereto, that the complain-
ants, a co-partnership, although subject to the provisions of 
Virginia Tax Code Section 176, were not at the time of the 
making of the contract sued on herein, duly licensed contrac-
tors under the provisions of said Tax Code Section, it is 
therefore adjudged, ordered and decreed that the said spe-
cial plea be, and the same hereby is ·sustained, and the de:-
murrer thereto be, and the same now hereby is overruled, in 
so far as the first ground stated in said demurrer; and it be-
ing represented to the Court_ by counsel for the complain-
ants, that the complainants herein · have complied with 
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the provision~ of Virginia Code Section 4722 (1) in that they 
filed on July 29, 1948 a certificate of co-partnership as· re-
quired by p~ragraph 2 of said Code Section in and that they 
have further complied with said Section in that they filed on 
July 29, 1948 a certificate showing the trading by them un-
der a :fictitious name : Whereupon, counsel for the 
page 29 } defendants, asked leave of the Court to withdraw 
grounds 2 and 3 stated in said special plea, which 
leave was and now hereby is granted: 
TO WHICH ACTION OF THE COURT, in sustaining the 
special plea of the defendants on the .first ground stated 
therein, to-wit, that the complainants were not either indi-
vidually or as a co-partnership, licensed as a contractor as 
required by the provisions of Virginia Tax Code Section 176, 
at the time of the making of the contract with the defendant, 
Edgar W. Revercomb, the Complainants, by counsel, ex-
cepted, and assigned as grounds for said exception the f al-
lowing: 
i: That the provisions of Virg·inia Tax Code 176 constitute 
a revenue measure only, are not a police measure, and there-
fore the contract which is the subject of this suit is valid and 
enforcible; 
2: That from an examination of said Tax Code Section 
176, it cannot be determined that the Legislature intended 
that contracts in contravention thereof should be void and 
unenforcible; · 
3: That the matt~r prohibited by said Tax Code Section 
176 is merely mala prohibit"um, and that the prohibition is 
not a safeguard against the perpetration of frauds on the 
public. 
This suit is, therefore, dismissed, at the costs of the com-
plainants. 
And this decree if FINAL. 
Seen: 
(signed) PAULE. BROWN 
Judge. 
HARDEE CHAMBLISS, JR. 
Attorney for defendants. 
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pag~ 30} I, Thomas P. Chapman, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit 
· Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing and hereunto annexed papers con-
stitute a true and correct transcript of the record in the 
cm use of E. H. Welles, Leonard C. Welles, and Richard H. 
Welles, partners, trading under the sty le and firm name of-
Welles Engineering Company, . Complainant, versus Edgar 
W. Reve:rcome and Ethel F. Nagle, Defendants, In Chancery 
No. 7203, in conformity with Sections 6339 and/or Section-
6342 of the Code of Virgina. 
I further certify that the notice required by said Section 
6339 of the Code _of Virginia was duly given by the Complain-
ants by the service of said notice by the Sheriff of Fairfax 
County on Hardee Chambliss, Jr., Attorney for Defendants. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of September, 1948. 
THOM.AS P. CHAPMAN, JR., 
Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M.·B .. WATTS, C. C. 
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